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Abstract—We address the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE)
problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each
agent can only observe the actions of some neighbors, while
its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of other
agents. As main contribution, we design a fully-distributed,
single-layer, fixed-step algorithm to seek a variational GNE,
based on a proximal best-response augmented with consensus and
constraint-violation penalization terms. Furthermore, we propose
a variant of our method, specifically devised for aggregative
games. We establish convergence, under strong monotonicity and
Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping, by deriving our algo-
rithms as proximal-point methods, opportunely preconditioned
to distribute the computation among the agents. This operator-
theoretic interpretation proves very powerful. First, it allows us to
demonstrate convergence of our algorithms even if the proximal
best-response is computed inexactly by the agents. Secondly,
it favors the implementation of acceleration schemes that can
improve the convergence speed. The potential of our algorithms
is validated numerically, revealing much faster convergence with
respect to known gradient-based methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generalized games model the interaction between selfish
decision makers, or agents, that aim optimizing their individ-
ual, but inter-dependent, objective functions, subject to shared
constraints. This competitive scenario has received increas-
ing attention with the spreading of networked systems, due
to the numerous engineering applications, including demand
response in competitive markets [1], demand-side management
in the smart grid [2], charging/discharging of electric vehicles
[3] and radio communication [4]. From a game-theoretic
perspective, the challenge is is to assign the agents behavioral
rules that eventually ensure the attainment of an equilibrium.
In fact, a recent part of the literature focuses on designing
distributed algorithms to seek a GNE, a joint action from
which no agent has interest to unilaterally deviate [5], [6], [7],
[8]. In the cited works, the computational effort is partitioned
among the agents, but under the assumption that each of them
has access to the decision of all the competitors (or to an
aggregation value, in the case of aggregative games). Such an
hypothesis, referred as full-decision information, requires the
presence of a central coordinator that can communicate with
all the agents, and might be impractical in some domains [9],
[10]. One example is the Nash-Cournot competition model
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described in [11], where the profit of each of a group of firms
depends not only on its own production, but also on the total
supply, a quantity not directly accessible by any of the firms.
A solution is offered by fully-distributed algorithms that can
be implemented by relying on peer-to-peer communication
only. Specifically, we consider the so-called partial-decision
information scenario, where the agents agree on sharing their
strategies with some neighbors on a network; based on the
knowledge exchange, they can estimate and eventually recon-
struct the action of all the competitors.
The partial-decision information setup has only been studied
very recently. A number of approaches have been proposed
for non-generalized games (i.e., in the absence of coupling
constraints) [11], [12], [13], [14]. Instead, fewer works deal
with the presence of shared constraints, despite this is a
significant extension, which arises naturally when the agents
compete for common resources [5, 2]. For example, in the
Nash-Cournot model described above, the overall production
of the firms is bounded by the market capacity. Of particular
interest for this paper is the technique in [15], where the GNE
problem is reformulated as that of finding a zero of a monotone
operator. Indeed, the operator-theoretic approach is very ele-
gant and convenient: several splitting methods are already well
established to solve monotone inclusions, and the properties
of fixed-point iterations are well understood [16, 26], thus
providing a unified framework to design algorithms and study
their convergence. For instance, a fully-distributed method for
aggregative games with affine coupling constraints is proposed
in [17], based on a preconditioned forward-backward splitting
[16, 26.5]. The authors of [18] exploit results on fixed-point
iterations with errors [19] to solve generalized aggregative
games on time-varying networks. All the aforementioned
formulations resort to (projected) gradient and consensus dy-
namics, and are single-layer (i.e., they require a fixed number
of communications per iteration). As a drawback, due to the
partial-decision information assumption, theoretical guarantees
are obtained only for small (or vanisihing) stepsizes, which
significantly affects the speed of convergence. Alternatively,
the work [20] presents a proximal-point algorithm (PPA)
to solve (merely monotone) GNE problems, possibly under
partial-information, but that requires an increasing number of
communications at each step. Similarly, double-layer proximal
best-response dynamics are designed in [21] for stochastic
games.
However, the extensive communication required may be a
performance bottleneck, both if a large number of iterations is
needed to converge and if the agents have to send information
multiple times for each time step. In fact, the communication
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2time can overwhelm the time spent on local useful processing
- e.g., this is a common problem in parallel computing [22].
Even neglecting the time lost in the transmission, sending large
volumes of data on wireless networks results in an increased
energetic cost.
Contributions: To improve speed and efficiency, we design
fast, single-layer, fixed-step, fully-distributed algorithms to
solve GNE problems with affine coupling constraints, in a
partial-decision information scenario. Our contributions are
summarized as follows:
• We derive a novel GNE seeking preconditioned proximal-
point algorithm (PPPA), with convergence guarantees under
strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game
mapping. Convergence holds even if the proximal operator
is computed inexactly (with summable errors). Our analysis
relies on fixed-point iterations and exploits a restricted
monotonicity property. Thanks to the use of a novel pre-
conditioning matrix, our algorithm is fully-distributed and
requires only one communication per iteration. To the best
of our knowledge, our scheme is the first non-gradient-
based, single-layer (G)NE seeking method for the partial-
decision information setup (III-IV);
• We tailor our method to efficiently solve aggregative games.
Specifically, we design a single-layer GNE seeking PPPA
where the agents only keep and exchange an estimate of
the aggregative value, instead of an estimate of all the other
agents’ actions (V);
• By exploiting our operator-theoretic formulation, we apply
some acceleration schemes [23] to our PPPA and provide
convergence guarantees. We observe via numerical simula-
tions that the iterations needed to converge can be reduced
up a factor two (VI);
• Via numerical simulations, we compare our approach to the
pseudo-gradient method in [15], which is the only other
known fully-distributed, single-layer, fixed-step GNE seek-
ing algorithm (excluding that in [17], for the special class
of aggregative games). Our simulations show that our PPPA
significantly outperforms the method in [15] in terms of the
number of iterations needed to converge, thus considerably
reducing the communication burden, at the price of locally
solving a strongly-convex optimization problem, rather than
performing a projection, at each time step. Moreover, our
scheme only requires one communication per iteration,
instead of two (VII).
Basic notation: N denotes the set of natural numbers,
including 0. R (R≥0) is the set of (nonnegative) real numbers.
0n (1n) denotes the vector of dimension n with all elements
equal to 0 (1); In ∈ Rn×n denotes the identity matrix of
dimension n; the subscripts might be omitted when there is
no ambiguity. For a matrix A ∈ Rn×m, its transpose is A>,
[A]i,j represents the element on the row i and column j.
null(A) = {x ∈ Rm | Ax = 0n} and range(A) = {v ∈
Rn | v = Ax for some x ∈ Rm} are the null-space and
image of A, respectively. ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
‖A‖ is the largest singular value of A, ‖A‖∞ the maximum
of the absolute row sums of A. A  0 stands for symmetric
positive definite matrix. Given A  0, 〈x | y〉A = x>Ay
denotes the A-induced inner product of the vectors x and
y, ‖x‖A =
√
x>Ax denotes the the A-induced norm of the
vector x; we omit the subscript if A = I . If A ∈ Rn×n is
symmetric, λmin(A) = λ1(A) ≤ · · · ≤ λn(A) =: λmax(A)
denote its eigenvalues. diag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes the block
diagonal matrix with A1, . . . , AN on its diagonal. Given N
vectors x1, . . . , xN , col (x1, . . . , xN ) = [x>1 . . . x
>
N ]
>. For
a differentiable function g : Rn → R, ∇xg(x) denotes its
gradient. `1 is the set of absolutely summable sequences.
Operator-theoretic background: For a function ψ : Rn →
R ∪ {∞}, dom(ψ) := {x ∈ Rn | ψ(x) < ∞}. The mapping
ιS : Rn → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the
set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., ιS(x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. A set-
valued mapping (or operator) F : Rn ⇒ Rn is characterized
by its graph gra(F) = {(x, u) | u ∈ F(x)}. dom(F) =
{x ∈ Rn|F(x) 6= ∅}, fix (F) := {x ∈ Rn | x ∈ F(x)}
and zer (F) := {x ∈ Rn | 0 ∈ F(x)} denote the domain, set
of fixed points and set of zeros, respectively. F−1 denotes
the inverse operator of F , defined through its graph as
gra(F−1) = {(u, x) | (x, u) ∈ gra(F)}. F : Rn ⇒ Rn is
(µ-strongly) monotone if 〈u−v, x−y〉 ≥ 0 (≥ µ‖x−y‖2), for
all (x, u),(y, v) ∈ gra(F). Id(·) denotes the identity operator.
For a function ψ : Rn → R ∪ {∞}, ∂ψ : dom(ψ) ⇒ Rn
denotes its subdifferential operator, defined as ∂ψ(x) := {v ∈
Rn | ψ(z) ≥ ψ(x) + v>(z − x) for all z ∈ dom(ψ)}; if
ψ is differentiable and convex, its subdifferential operator
is its gradient. NS : Rn ⇒ Rn denotes the normal cone
operator for the the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., NS(x) = ∅ if x /∈ S,{
v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v>(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. If S is closed
and convex, it holds that ∂ιS = NS , and (Id + NS)−1 = PS
is the Euclidean projection onto the set S. JF := (Id +F)−1
denotes the resolvent operator of F . A single-valued operator
F : Rn → Rn is firmly (quasi)nonexpansive if ‖F(x) −
F(y)‖2 ≤ ‖x − y‖2 − ‖(Id − F)(x) − (Id − F)(y)‖, for
all x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Rn (y ∈ fix(F)).
II. MATHEMATICAL SETUP
We consider a set of agents, I := {1, . . . , N}, where
each agent i ∈ I shall choose its decision variable (i.e.,
strategy) xi from its local decision set Ωi ⊆ Rni . Let
x := col((xi)i∈I) ∈ Ω denote the stacked vector of all the
agents’ decisions, Ω = Ω1×· · ·×ΩN ⊆ Rn the overall action
space and n :=
∑N
i=1 ni. The goal of each agent i ∈ I is to
minimize its objective function Ji(xi, x−i), which depends on
both the local variable xi and on the decision variables of the
other agents x−i := col((xj)j∈I\{i}).
Furthermore, the feasible decision set of each agent depends
also on the action of the other agents via affine coupling
constraints. Specifically, the overall feasible set is
X := Ω ∩ {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ b} , (1)
where A := [A1, . . . , AN ] and b :=
∑N
i=1 bi, with Ai ∈
Rm×ni and bi ∈ Rm being local data. The game then is
represented by the inter-dependent optimization problems:
∀i ∈ I : argmin
yi∈Rni
Ji(yi, x−i) s.t. (yi, x−i) ∈ X . (2)
3The technical problem we consider here is the computation of
a GNE, as formalized next.
Definition 1: A collective strategy x∗ = col ((x∗i )i∈I) is a
generalized Nash equilibrium if, for all i ∈ I,
Ji
(
x∗i , x
∗
−i
) ≤ inf{Ji (yi, x∗−i) | (yi, x∗−i) ∈ X}.
Next, we postulate some common regularity and convexity
assumptions for the constraint sets and cost functions, see,
e.g., [15, Ass. 1], [24, Ass. 1].
Standing Assumption 1: For each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is
non-empty, closed and convex; X is non-empty and satisfies
Slater’s constraint qualification; Ji is continuous and the
function Ji (·, x−i) is convex and continuously differentiable
for every x−i. 
Among all the possible GNEs, we focus on the subclass
of variational GNEs (v-GNEs) [5, Def. 3.11], which enjoys
important structural properties, such as “economic fairness”1.
The v-GNEs are so called because they coincide with the
solutions of the variational inequality VI(F,X )2, where F is
the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game:
F (x) := col ((∇xiJi(xi, x−i))i∈I) . (3)
Under Standing Assumption 1, x∗ is a v-GNE of the game in
(2) if and only if there exist a dual variable λ∗ ∈ Rm such
that the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are
satisfied [5, Th. 4.8]:
0n ∈ F (x∗) +A>λ∗ + NΩ (x∗)
0m ∈ − (Ax∗ − b) + NmR≥0 (λ∗).
(4)
A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique v-GNE
for the game in (2) is the strong monotonicity of the pseudo-
gradient [25, Th. 2.3.3], as postulated next. This assumption
is always used for (G)Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking under
partial-decision information with fixed step sizes, e.g., in [13,
Ass. 2], [15, Ass. 3] (while it is sometimes replaced by
strict monotonicity and compactness of X when allowing for
vanishing step sizes [11, Ass. 2]). It implies strong convexity
of the functions Ji(·, x−i) for every x−i, but not necessarily
(strong) convexity of Ji in the full argument.
Standing Assumption 2: The pseudo-gradient mapping in (3)
is µ-strongly monotone and θ0-Lipschitz continuous, for some
µ, θ0 > 0: for any pair x, y ∈ Rn, (x− y)>(F (x)−F (y)) ≥
µ‖x− y‖2 and ‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ θ0‖x− y‖. 
III. FULLY-DISTRIBUTED EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
In this section, we present an algorithm to seek a GNE of
the game in (2) in a fully-distributed way. Specifically, each
agent i only knows its own cost function Ji and feasible set
Ωi, and a portion of the coupling constraints, namely (Ai, bi).
1Informally speaking, a v-GNE is a GNE where the cost of the common
limitations is fairly shared; for example, if Ωi = R and Ai = 1 for all i,
the first condition in (4) means that, at a v-GNE, the marginal loss due to
the presence of the coupling constraints is the same for each agent, namely
λ∗ ≥ 0. For an overview on v-GNEs, please refer to [5], [24].
2For an operator M : Rn → Rn and a set S ⊆ Rn, the variational
inequality VI(M,S) is the problem of finding a vector ω∗ ∈ S such that
M(ω∗)(ω − ω∗) ≥ 0, for all ω ∈ S [25, Def. 1.1.1].
Moreover, agent i does not have full knowledge of x−i, and
only relies on the information exchanged locally with some
neighbors over an undirected communication network G(I, E).
The unordered pair (i, j) belongs to the set of edges, E , if and
only if agent i and j can mutually exchange information. We
denote: W = [wij ]i,j∈I ∈ RN×N the weighted symmetric
adjacency matrix of G, with wij > 0 if (i, j) ∈ E , wij = 0
otherwise, and the convention wii = 0 for all i ∈ I; L =
D−W the weighted symmetric Laplacian matrix of G, where
D ∈ RN×N is the degree matrix of G, i.e., D = diag((di)i∈I)
and di =
∑N
j=1 wij , for all i ∈ I; Ni = {j | (i, j) ∈ E}
the set of neighbors of agent i. Moreover, we label the edges
(e`)`∈{1,...,E}, where E is the cardinality of the edges set E ,
and we assign to each edge e` an arbitrary orientation. We
denote the weighted incidence matrix as V ∈ RE×N , where
[V ]`,i =
√
(wij) if e` = (i, j) and i is the output vertex of e`,
[V ]`,i = −
√
(wij) if e` = (i, j) and j is the input vertex of
e`, [V ]`,i = 0 otherwise. It holds that L = V >V ; moreover,
null(V ) = null(L) = {κ1N , κ ∈ R} under the following
connectedness assumption [26, Ch. 8].
Standing Assumption 3: The communication graph G(I, E)
is undirected and connected. 
In the partial-decision information scenario, to cope with
the lack of knowledge, each agent keeps an estimate of
all other agents’ actions [27], [28], [15]. We denote xi =
col((xi,j)j∈I) ∈ RNn, where xi,i := xi and xi,j is agent
i’s estimate of agent j’s action, for all j 6= i; let also
xj,−i := col((xj,`)`∈I\{i}). Moreover, each agent keeps an
estimate λi ∈ Rm≥0 of the dual variable and an auxiliary
variable zi ∈ Rm. Our proposed dynamics are summarized
in Algorithm 1, where the global parameter α > 0 and the
step sizes τi, δi, for all i ∈ I, and ν have to be chosen
appropriately (see IV). We note that in Algorithm 1 the agents
evaluate their cost functions in their local estimates, not on the
actual collective strategy.
In steady state, agents should agree on their estimates,
i.e., xi = xj , λi = λj , for all i, j ∈ I. This motivates
the presence of consensual terms for both primal and dual
variables. We denote Eq := {y ∈ RNq : y = 1N⊗y, y ∈ Rq}
the consensual space of dimension q and E⊥q its orthogonal
complement, for any integer q > 0. Specifically, En is the
estimate consensus subspace and Em is the dual variable
consensus subspace.
Remark 1: The functions Ji(·,xi,−i) are strongly convex,
for all xi,−i, for all i ∈ I, as a consequence of Standing
Assumption 2. Therefore the argmin operator in Algorithm 1
is single-valued, and the algorithm is well defined. 
IV. DERIVATION AND CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive Algorithm 1 as a PPPA and
show its convergence by leveraging a restricted monotonicity
property. Before going into details, we need some definitions.
We denote x = col((xi)i∈I). Besides, let us define, as in [15,
4Algorithm 1 Fully-distributed v-GNE seeking via PPPA
Initialization: For all i ∈ I, set x0i ∈ Ωi, x0i,−i ∈ Rn−ni , z0i = 0m, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0.
For all k > 0: Communication: The agents exchange the variables {xki ,xki,−i, λki } with their neighbors.
Each agent i ∈ I does:
Distributed Averaging:
xˆki =
1
di
∑N
j=1 wijx
k
j,i, xˆ
k
i,−i =
1
di
∑N
j=1 wijx
k
j,−i, λˆ
k
i =
1
di
∑N
j=1 wijλ
k
j .
Local variables update:
xk+1i,−i =
1
τi+di
(τix
k
i,−i + dixˆ
k
i,−i)
xk+1i = argmin
y∈Ωi
(
Ji(y,x
k+1
i,−i) +
τi
2α
∥∥y − xki ∥∥2 + di2α∥∥y − xˆki ∥∥2 + 1α (A>i λki )>y)
zi
k+1 = zki +
di
ν (λ
k
i − λˆki )
λk+1i = PRm≥0
(
λki +
1
δi
(
Ai(2x
k+1
i − xki )− bi − (2zk+1i − zki )
))
.
Eq.13-14], for all i ∈ I,
Ri :=
[
0ni×n<i Ini 0ni×n>i
]
, (5a)
Si :=
[
In<i 0n<i×ni 0n<i×n>i
0n>i×n<i 0n>i×ni In>i
]
, (5b)
where n<i :=
∑
j<i,j∈I nj , n>i :=
∑
j>i,j∈I nj . In sim-
ple terms, Ri selects the i-th ni dimensional component
from an n-dimensional vector, while Si removes it. Thus,
Rixi = xi,i = xi and Sixi = xi,−i. We define R :=
diag ((Ri)i∈I), S := diag ((Si)i∈I). It follows that x = Rx
and col((xi,−i)i∈I) = Sx ∈ R(N−1)n. Moreover, we have
that
x = R>x+ S>Sx. (6)
We define the extended pseudo-gradient mapping F as
F (x) := col ((∇xiJi (xi,xi,−i))i∈I) , (7)
and the operators
Fa(x) := αR>F (x) + (Dn −Wn)x, (8)
A(ω) :=
Fa(x)0Em
b
+
 NΩ(x)0Em
NRNm≥0 (λ)
+
 R>A>λ−Vmλ
−ARx+ V >m v
 (9)
where α > 0 is a fixed design parameter, ω := col(x,v,λ),
with v = col((vi)`∈{1,...,E}) ∈ REm, λ = col((λi)i∈I) ∈
RNm, A := diag((Ai)i∈I), Wn := W ⊗ In, Dn := D ⊗ In,
Vm := V ⊗ Im, and Ω := {x ∈ RnN | Rx ∈ Ω}.
The following lemma relates the unique v-GNE of the game
in (2) to the zeros of the operator A. The proof is analogous
to [15, Th. 1] or Lemma 10 in V, and hence it is omitted.
Lemma 1: The following statements hold:
i) If col(x∗,v∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A), then x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗ and x∗
is the v-GNE of the game in (2).
ii) zer(A) 6= ∅. 
A. Derivation of the algorithm
Lemma 1 is fundamental, because it allows us recast the
GNE problem as that of computing a zero of the mapping
A in (9). In turn, this can be efficiently done by applying
standard operator-splitting methods [16, 26-28]. By following
this approach, fully-distributed GNE seeking dynamics were
developed by the authors of [15], [18]. In effect, in this
section we show that also Algorithm 1 is an instance of the
PPA [16, Th. 23.41], applied to seek a zero of the (suitably
preconditioned) operator A.
Nonetheless, technical difficulties arise because of the
partial-decision information setup. Specifically, the operator
A is not monotone in general, not even if strong monotonic-
ity of the pseudo-gradient mapping F holds, i.e., Standing
Assumption 2. This is due to the fact that, in the extended
pseudo-gradient in (7), the partial gradient ∇xiJi (xi,xi,−i) is
evaluated on the local estimate xi,−i, and not on the actual
value x−i. Only when the estimates x belong to the consensus
subspace, i.e. x = 1N ⊗ x (namely, the estimate of each
agents coincide with the actual value of x), we have that
F (x) = F (x).
We remark that many operator-theoretic properties are not
guaranteed for the resolvent JB = (Id + B)−1 of a non-
monotone operator B : Rq ⇒ Rq . By definition, it still holds
that zer(B) = fix(JB), but JB may have a limited domain, or
be not single-valued. In this general case, we write the PPA
as
(∀k ∈ N) ωk+1 ∈ JB(ωk), (10)
that is well defined only if JB(ωk) 6= ∅ for all k.
Next, we show that Algorithm 1 is obtained by applying the
iteration in (10) to the operator Φ−1A, where
Φ :=
τ¯ +Wn 0 −R>A>0 ν¯ Vm
−AR V >m δ¯
 (11)
is called preconditioning matrix, and the step sizes τ¯ =
diag((τiIn)i∈I), ν¯ = νIEm, δ¯ = diag((δiIm)i∈I), have to
be chosen such that Φ is positive definite. In this case, it also
holds that zer(Φ−1A) = zer(A). Sufficient conditions that
ensure Φ  0 are provided in the next lemma, that follows by
the Gershgorin’s circle theorem.
Lemma 2: The matrix Φ in (11) is positive definite if ν >
‖V ‖∞ and, for all i ∈ I, τi > di + ‖A>i ‖∞, δi > ‖Ai‖∞ +∑N
j=0
√
wij . 
5In the following, we always assume that the step sizes in
Algorithm 1 are chosen such that Φ  0. Then, we are able
to formulate the following result.
Lemma 3: Algorithm 1 is equivalent to the iteration
(∀k ∈ N) ωk+1 ∈ JΦ−1A(ωk), (12)
with A as in (9), Φ as in (11): for any initial condition ω0 =
col(x0,v0 = 0Em,λ
0), the sequence (xk,V >m v
k,λk)k∈N
generated by (12) is identical to the sequence (xk, zk,λk)k∈N
generated by Algorithm 1 with initial conditions (x0, z0 =
0Nm,λ
0). 
Proof. By definition of inverse operator we have that
ωk+1 ∈ (Id + Φ−1A)−1ωk
⇔ 0 ∈ ωk+1 + Φ−1Aωk+1 − ωk
⇔ 0 ∈ Φ(ωk+1 − ωk) +Aωk+1
⇔

0 ∈ τ¯(xk+1 − xk) +Wnxk+1 −Wnxk −(((((
(R>A>λk+1
+R>A>λk + αR>F (xk+1) + NΩ(xk+1)
+Dnx
k+1

−Wnxk+1 +(((((
(R>A>λk+1
0 ∈ ν¯(vk+1 − vk) +Vmλk+1 − Vmλk −Vmλk+1
0 ∈ δ¯(λk+1 − λk) + NRmN≥0 (λ
k+1) + b
−AR(2xk+1 − xk) + V >m (2vk+1 − vk)
(13)
In turn, the first inclusion in (13) can be split in two compo-
nents by left-multiplying both sides withR and S. By noticing
that SNΩ = 0(N−1)n, RR> = In and SR> = 0(N−1)n×n,
we get
0(N−1)n ∈ S((τ¯ +Dn)xk+1 − τ¯xk −Wnxk)
0n ∈ R((τ¯ +Dn)xk+1 − τ¯xk −Wnxk)
+ NΩ(x
k+1) + αF ((xk+1,Sxk+1))
+A>λk
⇔
∀i∈I

xk+1i,−i =
1
τi+di
(τix
k
i,−i +
∑N
j=1 wijx
k
j,−i)
0ni ∈ ∂xk+1i
(
Ji(x
k+1
i ,x
k+1
i,−i) +
τi
2α
∥∥xk+1i − xki ∥∥2
+ 12αdi
∥∥dixk+1i −∑Nj=1 wijxkj,i∥∥2
+ ιΩi(x
k+1
i ) +
1
α (A
>
i λ
k
i )
>xk+1i
)
.
Therefore, since the zeros of the subdifferential of a (strongly)
convex function coincide with the minima (unique minimum)
[16, Th. 16.3], (13) can be rewritten as
∀i ∈ I :
xk+1i,−i =
1
τi+di
(τix
k
i,−i +
∑N
j=1 wijx
k
j,−i)
xk+1i = argmin
y∈Ωi
(
Ji(y,x
k+1
i,−i) +
τi
2α
∥∥y − xki ∥∥2
+ 12αdi
∥∥diy −∑Nj=1 wijxkj,i∥∥2 + 1α (A>i λki )>y)
vk+1 = vk +
1
ν
Vmλ
k
λk+1 = PRmN≥0
(
λk + δ¯−1
(
AR(2xk+1 − xk)− b
− V >m (2vk+1 − vk)
))
(14)
The conclusion follows by defining zk := V >m v
k, where zk =
col((zi)i∈I) ∈ RNm and zki ∈ Rm are local auxiliary variables
kept by each agent, provided that z0 = V >m v
0. The latter is
ensured by z0 = 0Nm, as in Algorithm 1.
Remark 2: The preconditioning matrix Φ is designed to
make the system of inclusions in (13) block triangular, i.e.,
to remove the term Wnxk+1 and R>A>λk+1 from the first
inclusion, and the terms Vmλk+1 from the second: in this
way, xk+1i and z
k+1 do not depend on xk+1j , for i 6= j, or
λk+1. This ensures that the resulting iteration can be computed
by the agents in a fully-distributed fashion. Furthermore, the
change of variable z = V >m v reduces the number of auxiliary
variables and decouples the dual update in (14) from the graph
structure. 
Remark 3: By Lemma 3, Remark 1 and by the explicit
form of the resolvent JΦ−1A in (14), we conclude that
dom(JΦ−1A) = RNn+Em+Nm and that JΦ−1A is single-
valued on its domain. 
B. Convergence analysis
The convergence of Algorithm 1 cannot be inferred by
standard results for the PPA, because the operator A (or
Φ−1A) is not monotone in general. The loss of monotonicity is
the main technical difficulty that arises when studying (G)NE
seeking under partial-decision information, and it is due to the
fact that R>F (x) is very rarely monotone in cases of interest
(see Appendix D). However, a restricted strong monotonicity
property holds for the operator Fa in (8), that was exploited,
e.g., in [29], [15], [27]. Analogously, we make use of a
restricted monotonicity property of the operator A, which can
be guaranteed for any game satisfying Standing Assumptions
1-3, without additional hypotheses, as formalized in the next
two statements.
Lemma 4 ([30, Lemma 3]): The extended pseudo-gradient
mapping F in (7) is θ-Lipschitz continuous, for some µ ≤
θ ≤ θ0: for any x,y ∈ RNn, ‖F (x)−F (y)‖ ≤ θ‖x−y‖. 
Lemma 5: Let
αmax :=
4µλ2(L)
(θ0 + θ)2 + 4µθ
. (15)
If α ∈ (0, αmax] , then A is restricted monotone with respect to
zer(A): for any (ω,u) ∈ gra(A) and any (ω∗,u∗) ∈ gra(A)
such that ω∗ ∈ zer(A), it holds that
(ω − ω∗)> (u− u∗) ≥ 0.
Proof. The operator A in (9) is the sum of three operators.
The second is monotone by properties of normal cones [16,
Th. 20.25]; the third is a linear skew-symmetric operator,
hence monotone [16, Ex. 20.35]. Let ω = col(x,v,λ) and
ω∗ = col(x∗,v∗,λ∗). By Lemma 1, x∗ ∈ En, hence by [15,
Lemma 3], it also holds that (x− x∗)> (Fa(x)−Fa(x∗)) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the first term in A is restricted monotone with
respect to zer(A), and the conclusion follows readily.
Moreover, the operator Φ−1A retains this property, in the
space induced by the inner product 〈·|·〉Φ.
Lemma 6: Let αmax be as in (15) and assume that α ∈
(0, αmax] is chosen. Then Φ−1A is restricted monotone, with
respect to zer(A), in the Φ-induced space: for all (ω,u) ∈
6gra(Φ−1A) and all (ω∗,u∗) ∈ gra(Φ−1A) such that ω∗ ∈
zer(A), it holds that
〈u− u∗ | ω − ω∗〉Φ ≥ 0.
Proof. By definition, (ω,Φu), (ω∗,Φu∗) ∈ gra(A). Hence
the restricted monotonicity in Lemma 5 reads as 0 ≤ 〈Φu −
Φu∗ | ω − ω∗〉 = 〈u− u∗ | ω − ω∗〉Φ.
Based on the restricted monotonicity property in Lemma 6,
in the remainder of the section we show that the iteration
in (12) converges to a point in fix(JΦ−1A) = zer(Φ−1A) =
zer(A). Our analysis is based on an existing result for iter-
ations of firmly quasinonexpansive (FQNE) operators, that is
reported next for readability.
Lemma 7 ([16, Prop. 4.2, Th. 4.3]): Let H be a finite
dimensional Hilbert space equipped with a scalar product
〈·|·〉a, and T : H → H be a firmly quasinonexpansive operator,
such that dom(T ) = H, C := fix(T ) 6= ∅. Let (γk)k∈N be
a sequence in [0, 2], and (ek)k∈N a sequence in H such that
(γk‖ek‖a)k∈N ∈ `1. Let ω0 ∈ H and set:
(∀k ∈ N) ωk+1 = ωk + γk(T (ωk)− ωk + ek). (16)
Then the following statements hold:
(i) (∃(k)k∈N ∈ `1)(∀ω∗ ∈ C)(∀k ∈ N) ‖ωk+1 − ω∗‖a ≤
‖ωk − ω∗‖a + |k|.
(ii)
(
γk(2− γk)‖T (ωk)− ωk‖2a
)
k∈N ∈ `1.
(iii) Suppose that every cluster point of (ωk)k∈N belongs to
C. Then, (ωk)k∈N converges to a point in C. 
We already noted in Remark 3 that the operator JΦ−1A is
single valued, with dom(JΦ−1A) = RNn+Em+En. However,
to be able to apply the previous lemma to the iteration in (12),
we still need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 8: Let α ∈ (0, αmax], αmax as in (15). Then, JΦ−1A
if firmly quasinonexpansive in the Φ-induced norm, i.e., for
all ω, for all ω∗ ∈ fix(JΦ−1A) = zer(A), it holds that
‖JΦ−1A(ω)−ω∗‖2Φ ≤ ‖ω−ω∗‖2Φ − ‖JΦ−1A(ω)−ω‖2Φ.
Proof. Denote u = JΦ−1A(ω) and recall that ω∗ =
JΦ−1A(ω∗). By definition of resolvent and by definition of
inverse operator, it follows that ω − u ∈ Φ−1A(u), and
0 ∈ Φ−1A(ω∗). Therefore the restricted monotonicity prop-
erty in Lemma 6 reads as
〈ω − u | u− ω∗〉Φ ≥ 0.
In turn, the last inequality is equivalent to the firmly quasi-
nonexpansiveness of JΦ−1A [16, Prop. 4.2(iv)].
Lemma 9: JΦ−1A is continuous. 
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1: Assume that α ∈ (0, αmax] is chosen, αmax as in
(15), and that the step sizes τ¯ , ν¯, δ¯ are chosen as in Lemma 2.
Then, the sequence (xk, zk,λk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 1
converges to an equilibrium (x∗, z∗,λ∗), where x∗ = 1N⊗x∗
and x∗ is the v-GNE of the game in (2). 
Proof. By Lemma 3, we can equivalently study the conver-
gence of the iteration in (12). In turn, (12) can be rewritten
as (16) with T = JΦ−1A and γk = 1, ek = 0, for all
k ∈ N, since JΦ−1A is firmly quasinonexpansive with respect
to the norm ‖ · ‖Φ by Lemma 8 and it has full domain by
Remark 3. Moreover, fix(JΦ−1A) = zer(A) by definition of
resolvent, and hence fix(JΦ−1A) 6= ∅ by Lemma 1. The
sequence (ωk)k∈N is bounded by Lemma 7(i). Therefore,
(ωk)k∈N admits at least one cluster point, say ω¯, and denote
(kn)n∈N a nondecreasing diverging subsequence such that
(ωkn)n∈N converges to ω¯. Since JΦ−1A(ωkn) − ωkn → 0
by Lemma 7(ii) and by the continuity of JΦ−1A in Lemma 9,
it follows that JΦ−1A(ω¯) = ω¯. Therefore all the cluster points
of (ωk)k∈N belongs to fix(JΦ−1A) and the convergence to an
equilibrium of (12) follows by Lemma 7(iii). The conclusion
follows by Lemma 1.
Remark 4: Algorithm 1 requires each agent i to solve
an optimization problem to compute xk+1i , at each iteration.
However, from Lemma 7 and by inspection of the proof
of Theorem 1, it is evident that the convergence result in
Theorem 1 still holds if an approximation is used in place of
the exact solution of the argmin in Algorithm 1, provided that
the errors with respect to the exact solution of the optimization,
eki , are absolutely summable, i.e., (e
k
i )k∈N ∈ `1, for all i ∈ I.
Further, the optimization problems are strongly convex, hence
they can be efficiently solved via iterative algorithms. 
V. AGGREGATIVE GAMES
In aggregative games, ni = n¯ > 0 for all i ∈ I (hence
n = Nn¯) and the cost function of each agent depends only
on its local decision and on the value of the average strategy
avg(x) := 1N
∑
i∈Ixi. Therefore, for each i ∈ I, there is a
function fi : Rn¯×Rn¯ → R such that the original cost function
Ji in (2) can be written as
Ji(xi, x−i) =: fi(xi, avg(x)). (17)
Since an aggregative game is only a particular instance of
the game in (2), all the considerations on the existence
and uniqueness of a v-GNE and equivalence with the KKT
conditions in (4) are still valid.
Moreover, Algorithms 1 could still be used to compute a v-
GNE. This would require each agent to keep (and exchange)
an estimate of all other agents’ action, i.e., a vector of (N−1)n¯
components. In practice, however, the cost of each agent
is only a function of the aggregative value avg(x), whose
dimension n¯ is independent of the number N of agents.
To reduce the communication and computation burden, in
this section we introduce an algorithm specifically tailored
to seek a v-GNE in aggregative games, that is scalable with
the number of agents. The proposed iteration is shown in
Algorithm 2, where the parameters α, τi, δi for all i ∈ I,
and ν, β, have to be chosen appropriately and we used the
notation
F˜i(xi, ξi) := ∇xifi(xi, ξi) + 1N∇ξifi(xi, ξi). (18)
We note that F˜i(xi, avg(x)) = ∇xiJi(xi, x−i) =
∇xifi(xi, avg(x)).
Remark 5: The update of the local actions xki in Algorithm 2
is the solution of an inclusion, i.e., the problem of finding
a zero of an operator. Equivalently, the problem can be
7Algorithm 2 Fully-distributed v-GNE seeking in aggregative games via PPPA
Initialization: For all i ∈ I, set x0i ∈ Ωi, s0i = 0n¯, z0i = 0m, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0.
For all k > 0: Communication: The agents exchange the variables {σki = xki + ski , λki } with their neighbors.
Local variables update: each agent i ∈ I does
sk+1i = s
k
i − 1β
∑N
j=1 wij(σ
k
i − σkj )
xk+1 ← y s.t. 0n¯ ∈
[
τiy + αF˜i(y, y + s
k+1
i )− τixki +A>i λki +
∑N
j=1 wij(σ
k
i − σkj )
]
+ NΩi(y) (19)
zi
k+1 = zki +
1
ν
∑N
j=1 wij(λ
k
i − λkj )
λk+1i = PRm≥0
(
λki +
1
δi
(
Ai(2x
k+1
i − xki )− bi − (2zk+1i − zki )
))
.
reformulated as the variational inequality VI(gki (y),Ωi), where
gki is the mapping in the square brackets in (19). In this section,
we prove that, for appropriate choices of the parameters, a
solution exists and it is unique (hence the algorithm is well
defined) and we suggest methods to find it. Moreover, we
show how the update can be simplified for many problems
of interest. For the time being, we note that the xki update
only depends on locally available variables, hence it does not
require communication among the agents. 
Since the agents rely on local information only, they do not
have access to the actual value of the average strategy. To
cope with the lack of information, each agent is embedded
with an auxiliary error variable si ∈ Rn¯, that is an estimate of
the quantity avg(x) − xi. Each agent aims at reconstructing
the true aggregate value, based on the information received
from its neighbors. In particular, it should hold that sk →
1N ⊗ avg(xk) − xk asymptotically, where s := col((si)i∈I).
For brevity of notation, we also denote
σi := xi + si, σ := col((σi)i∈I). (20)
Remark 6: By the updates in Algorithm 2, we can imme-
diately infer an invariance property of the iteration, namely
that avg(sk) = 0n¯, or equivalently that avg(xk) = avg(σk),
for any k ∈ N, provided that the algorithm is initialized
appropriately , i.e., s0i = 0n¯, for all i ∈ I. In fact, the update
of σk (as it follows from Algorithm 2) reads as
σk+1 = σk − 1βLn¯σk + (xk+1 − xk),
where Ln¯ := L⊗In¯. This update can be regarded as a dynamic
tracking for the time-varying quantity avg(x) [11] . 
We define the extended pseudo-gradient mapping as
F˜ (x, ξ) := col((F˜i(xi, ξi))i∈I) (21)
for ξ = col((ξi)i∈I) ∈ Rn, and the operator
A˜(ω) :=

αF˜ (x, σ) +Ln¯σ
Ln¯σ
0Em
b
+

NΩ(x)
0n
0Em
NRNm≥0 (λ)
+

A>λ
0n
−Vmλ
V >m v −Ax

(22)
where α > 0 is a fixed design parameter, ω :=
col(x, s,v,λ) ∈ R2n+Em+Nm and we recall that σ = x + s
is just a shorthand notation. We remark that F˜ (x,1N ⊗
avg(x)) = F (x), for all x ∈ Rn.
The rest of the section is devoted to the convergence analysis
of Algorithm 2. Similarly to IV, we first show that the iteration
is indeed a PPPA applied to find a zero of the operator A˜.
Then, we restrict our analysis to the invariant subspace
Σ := {(x, s,v,λ) ∈ R2n+Em+Nm | avg(s) = 0n¯}. (23)
We start by characterizing the zeros of the operator A˜.
Lemma 10: The following statements holds:
i) If col(x∗, s∗,v∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A˜) ∩ Σ, then s∗ = 1N ⊗
avg(x∗)− x∗ and x∗ is the v-GNE of the game in (2).
ii) zer(A˜) ∩ Σ 6= ∅. 
Proof. See Appendix B.
Next, similar to Lemma 5, we show a restricted monotonic-
ity property for the operator A˜.
Lemma 11: The mapping F˜ in (21) is θ˜-Lipschitz continu-
ous, for some θ˜ > 0. 
Proof. Proof. It follows from Lemma 4, by noticing that
F˜ (x, ξ) = F ((x, (IN ⊗ 1N−1 ⊗ In¯)( NN−1ξ − 1N−1x))).
Lemma 12: Let
α˜max :=
4µλ2(L)
θ˜2
. (24)
For any α ∈ (0, α˜max], for any (ω,u) ∈ gra(A˜) such that ω ∈
Σ, and any (ω∗,u∗) ∈ gra(A˜) such that ω∗ ∈ zer(A˜)∩Σ, it
holds that
(ω − ω∗)>(u− u∗) ≥ 0.
Proof. The operator A˜ is the sum of three components.
The second is monotone by properties of the normal cones
[16, Th. 20.25], the last because it is a linear skew-symmetric
operator [16, Ex. 20.35]. Let ω = col(x, s,v,λ) and
ω∗ = col(x∗, s∗,v∗,λ∗). By Lemma 10, we have s∗ =
1N ⊗ avg(x∗) − x∗. Therefore, by [17, Lemma 4], and
by defining σ = x + s, σ∗ = s∗ + x∗, it holds that
(x− x∗)>(αF˜ (x, σ)− αF˜ (x∗, σ∗) +Ln¯(σ − σ∗)) + (s −
s∗)>Ln¯(σ − σ∗) = (x − x∗)>(αF˜ (x, σ) − αF˜ (x∗, σ∗)) +
(σ − σ∗)>Ln¯(σ − σ∗) ≥ 0. The conclusion follows by
straightforward computation.
We are now ready to prove the convergence of Algorithm 2.
The result is based on applying the iteration in (10) to the
operator Φ˜−1A˜, where
Φ˜ :=

τ¯ −Ln¯ −Ln¯ 0 −A>
−Ln¯ β¯ −Ln¯ 0 0
0 0 ν¯ Vm
−A 0 V >m δ¯
 , (25)
8and the step sizes τ¯ = col((τiIn¯)i∈I), β¯ = βINn, ν¯ = νIEm,
δ¯ = col((δiIm)i∈I), have to be chosen such that the symmetric
preconditioning matrix Φ˜ is positive definite. In this case, it
also holds that zer(Φ˜−1A˜) = zer(A˜). Sufficient conditions
that ensure Φ˜  0 are provided next, which are based on the
generalized Gershgorin’s circle theorem [31, Th. 2].
Lemma 13: The matrix Φ˜ in (25) is positive definite if β >
2 max((di)i∈I) + ‖L‖, ν > ‖V ‖, and, for all i ∈ I, τi >
4di + ‖A>i ‖, δi > ‖Ai‖+
∑N
j=0
√
wij . 
Theorem 2: Assume that α ∈ (0,min(α˜max, 2
√
2(dmin)/θ˜)]
is chosen, with α˜max as in (24) and dmin = min((di)i∈I), and
that the step sizes τ¯ , β¯, ν¯, δ¯ are chosen as in Lemma 13. Then,
the sequence (xk, sk, zk,λk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 2
converges to an equilibrium (x∗,1 ⊗ avg(x∗) − x∗, z∗,λ∗),
where x∗ is the v-GNE of the game in (2). 
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 7: The update in (19) is implicitely defined by a
strongly monotone inclusion (see the proof of Theorem 2).
We remark that there are a number of iterative methods
(with linear convergence rate) to find the unique solution
of this inclusion [16, 26], or the equivalent VI [25, 12],
for example the forward-backward splitting [25, 12.5.1], [16,
26.5], (similar to a projected-gradient method). We note that
the agents can seek a solution in a completely decentralized
way, as the computation is only local. Also, the VIs have a
low dimension n¯ (differently from [20], where a subgame of
dimension n has to be solved at every step). Moreover, as in
Remark 4, convergence is guaranteed even if the solution is
only approximated at each step (with summable error). 
Remark 8: If F˜i(y, y + sk+1i ) is integrable with respect to
y, i.e., if there exists a function ai such that ∇yai(y, sk+1i ) =
F˜i(y, y+s
k+1
i ) (and, in this case, ai(y, s
k+1
i ) =
∫ 1
0
F˜i(ty, ty+
sk+1i )
>ydt), then the xki updates in Algorithm 2 can be
simplified as
xk+1i = argmin
y∈Ωi
(
αai(y, s
k+1
i ) +
τi
2α
∥∥y − xki ∥∥2 + 1α (A>i λki )>y
+ 12α
(∑N
j=1 wij(σ
k
i − σkj )
)>
y
)
, (26)
analogously to Lemma 3. The integrability condition always
holds for scalar functions, i.e., if n¯ = 1. Another notable
case is the class of aggregative games with cost functions
fi(xi, avg(x)) = f¯i(xi) + (Qi avg(x))
>xi, for some function
f¯i and symmetric matrix Qi; this setup models a number of
applications, e.g., the Nash-Cournot game described in [11]
or the resource allocation problem considered in [32]. In this
case, the functions ai are
ai(xi, si) = f¯i(xi) + (Qi(si + xi))
>xi − N−12N x>i Qixi.
Nevertheless, it is not needed for the agents to be able to
compute an explicit expression for ai, as the optimization
problem in (26) can be solved via (projected) gradient-based
methods. 
VI. ACCELERATIONS
In IV, we showed that Algorithm 1 can be recast (modulo
the change of variables z = V >m v) in the form (16), i.e.,
ωk+1 = T (ωk), (27)
with T = JΦ−1A a single-valued continuous FQNE mapping.
This compact operator representation allows for some modifi-
cations of Algorithm 1, according to well-known accelerations
schemes [23], that can increase its convergence speed. For the
sake of example, in this section we propose three accelerated
versions of Algorithm 1, and we present convergence results.
Other solutions could be obtained by combining different
schemes [23].
A. Overrelaxation
The overrelaxed iteration reads, in compact form, as
ωk+1 = ηT (ωk) + (1− η)ωk, (28)
where η ∈ [1, 2) is a relaxation parameter. The resulting
scheme is summarized in Algorithm 3, with the change of
variable z = V >m v (as for Algorithm 1 and (12)).
Theorem 3: Let α ∈ (0, αmax], αmax as in (15), and that
the step sizes τ¯ , ν¯, σ¯ are chosen as in Lemma 2. Then, for
any η ∈ [1, 2), the sequence (xk, zk,λk)k∈N generated by
Algorithm 3 converges to an equilibrium (x∗, z∗,λ∗), where
x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗ and x∗ is the GNE of the game in (2). 
Proof. The theorem follows directly from Lemma 7, as for
Therorem 1, by choosing γk = η for all k ∈ N.
B. Inertia
The inertial version of Algorithm 1 is summarized in Algo-
rithm 4, obtained (modulo the change of variable z = V >m v)
by expanding the compact form
ωk+1 = T (ωk + ρ(ωk − ωk−1)), (29)
with ρ ≥ 0 the inertia parameter.
Theorem 4: Let α ∈ (0, αmax], αmax as in (15), and that
the step sizes τ¯ , ν¯, σ¯ are chosen as in Lemma 2. Then, for
any ρ ∈ [0, 13 ), the sequence (xk, zk,λk)k∈N generated by
Algorithm 4 converges to an equilibrium (x∗, z∗,λ∗), where
x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗ and x∗ is the GNE of the game in (2). 
Proof (sketch). The proof is analogous to that of [33, Th.
5], which is formulated for nonexpansive operators3; however,
in the finite dimensional case, the proof holds for continuous
quasinonexpansive operators. Also, it can be shown that ρ
satisfies the bound in [33, Eq. 6].
C. Alternated inertia
The proposed scheme is shown in Algorithm 5 and reads in
compact form, modulo the change of variable z = V >m v, as{
ωk+1 = T (ωk) if k is even,
ωk+1 = T (ωk + ρ(ωk − ωk−1)) if k is odd.
(30)
Theorem 5: Let α ∈ (0, αmax], αmax as in (15), and that
the step sizes τ¯ , ν¯, σ¯ are chosen as in Lemma 2. Then, for
any ρ ∈ [0, 1), the sequence (xk, zk,λk)k∈N generated by
3We recall that an operator T is firmly (quasi)nonexpansive if and only if the
operator 2T − Id is (quasi)nonexpansive [16, Prop. 4.2, 4.4]: this observation
allows us to apply the proof of [33, Th. 5] to our setup.
9Algorithm 3 Fully-distributed v-GNE seeking via overrelaxed PPPA
Initialization: For all i ∈ I, set x0i ∈ Ωi, x0i,−i ∈ Rn−ni , z0i = 0m, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0.
For all k > 0: Communication: The agents exchange the variables {xki ,xki,−i, λki } with their neighbors.
Local auxiliary variables update: each agent i ∈ I does
x˜k+1i,−i =
1
τi+di
(τix
k
i,−i +
∑N
j=1 wijx
k
j,−i)
x˜k+1i = argmin
y∈Ωi
(
Ji(y,x
k+1
i,−i) +
τi
2α
∥∥y − xki ∥∥2 + 12αdi ∥∥diy −∑Nj=1 wijxkj,ix∥∥2 + 1α (A>i λki )>y)
z˜i
k+1 = zki +
1
ν
∑N
j=1 wij(λ
k
i − λkj )
λ˜k+1i = PRm≥0
(
λki +
1
σi
(
Ai(2x
k+1
i − xki )− bi − (2zk+1i − zki )
))
.
Local variable update (relaxation): each agent i ∈ I does
xk+1i,−i = ηx˜
k+1
i,−i + (1− η)xki,−i xk+1i = ηx˜k+1i + (1− η)xki
zi
k+1 = ηz˜k+1i + (1− η)zki λk+1i = ηλ˜k+1i + (1− η)λki
Algorithm 4 Fully-distributed v-GNE seeking via inertial PPPA
Initialization: For all i ∈ I, set x−1i = x0i ∈ Ωi, x−1i,−i = x0i,−i ∈ Rn−ni , z−1i = z0i = 0m, λ−1i = λ0i ∈ Rm≥0.
For all k > 0: Local auxiliary variables update: each agent i ∈ I does
x˜ki,−i = x
k
i,−i + γ(x
k
i,−i − xk−1i,−i) x˜ki = xki + γ(xki − xk−1i )
z˜ki = z
k
i + γ(z
k
i − zk−1i ) λ˜ki = λki + γ(λki − λk−1i )
Communication: The agents exchange the variables {x˜ki , x˜ki,−i, λ˜ki } with their neighbors.
Local variables update: each agent i ∈ I does
xk+1i,−i =
1
τi+di
(τix˜
k
i,−i +
∑N
j=1 wijx˜
k
j,−i)
xk+1i = argmin
y∈Ωi
(
Ji(y, x˜
k+1
i,−i) +
τi
2α
∥∥y − x˜ki ∥∥2 + 12αdi ∥∥diy −∑Nj=1 wijx˜kj,i∥∥2 + 1α (A>i λ˜ki )>y)
zi
k+1 = z˜ki +
1
ν
∑N
j=1 wij(λ˜
k
i − λ˜kj )
λk+1i = PRm≥0
(
λ˜ki +
1
σi
(
Ai(2x˜
k+1
i − x˜ki )− bi − (2z˜k+1i − z˜ki )
))
.
Algorithm 5 Fully-distributed v-GNE seeking via alternating inertial PPPA
Initialization: For all i ∈ I, set x−1i = x0i ∈ Ωi, x−1i,−i = x0i,−i ∈ Rn−ni , z−1i = z0i = 0m, λ−1i = λ0i ∈ Rm≥0.
For all k > 0: Auxiliary variables update: Set ρ˜k = 0 if k is even, ρ˜k = ρ otherwise. Each agent i ∈ I does
x˜ki,−i = x
k
i,−i + ρ˜
k(xki,−i − xk−1i,−i) x˜ki = xki + ρ˜k(xki − xk−1i )
z˜ki = z
k
i + ρ˜
k(zki − zk−1i ) λ˜ki = λki + ρ˜k(λki − λk−1i )
Communication: The agents exchange the variables {x˜ki , x˜ki,−i, λ˜ki } with their neighbors.
Local variables update: each agent i ∈ I does
xk+1i,−i =
1
τi+di
(τix˜
k
i,−i +
∑N
j=1 wijx˜
k
j,−i)
xk+1i = argmin
y∈Ωi
(
Ji(y, x˜
k+1
i,−i) +
τi
2α
∥∥y − x˜ki ∥∥2 + 12αdi ∥∥diy −∑Nj=1 wijx˜kj,i∥∥2 + 1α (A>i λ˜ki )>y)
zi
k+1 = z˜ki +
1
ν
∑N
j=1 wij(λ˜
k
i − λ˜kj )
λk+1i = PRm≥0
(
λ˜ki +
1
σi
(
Ai(2x˜
k+1
i − x˜ki )− bi − (2z˜k+1i − z˜ki )
))
.
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Algorithm 5 converges to an equilibrium (x∗, z∗,λ∗), where
x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗ and x∗ is the GNE of the game in (2). 
Proof (sketch). The proof follows analogously to the
proof of [23, Lemma 3.3], by exploiting that T is FQNE
and continuous (the original result is formulated for firmly
nonexpansive operators).
Remark 9: An analogous analysis can be carried out to
obtain accelerated versions of Algorithm 2. 
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Nash-Cournot game
We consider the Nash-Cournot game presented in [15, 6].
N firms produce a commodity that is sold to m markets. Each
firm i ∈ I = {1, . . . , N} is only allowed to participate in ni ≤
m of the markets, and the decision variables of each firm are
the quantities xi ∈ Rni of commodity to be delivered to these
ni markets. The quantity of product that each firm can deliver
to the markets is bounded by the local constraints 0ni ≤ xi ≤
Xi. Moreover, each market has a maximal capacity rk, for
k = 1, . . . ,m. This result in the shared affine constraint Ax ≤
r, with r = col((rk)k=1,...,m) and A = [A1 . . . AN ], where
Ai ∈ Rm×ni is the matrix that expresses which markets firm
i participates in. Specifically, the j-th column of Ai has its
k-th element equal to 1 if [xi]j is the amount of product sent
to the k-th market by agent i, for all j = 1, . . . , ni; all the
other elements are 0. Therefore, Ax =
∑N
i=1Aixi ∈ Rm
is the vector of the quantities of total product delivered to
each market. Each firm i aims at maximizing its profit, i.e.,
minimizing the cost function
Ji(xi, x−i) = ci(xi)− p(Ax)>Aixi.
Here, ci(xi) = x>i Qixi + q
>
i xi is firm i’s production cost,
with Qi ∈ Rni×ni , Qi  0, qi ∈ Rni . Instead, p : Rm → Rm
associate to each market a price that depends on the amount
of product delivered to that market. Specifically, the price for
the market k, for k = 1, . . . ,m, is pk(x) = P¯k -χk[Ax]k,
where P¯k, χk > 0.
We set N = 20, m = 7. The market structure is
defined as in [15, Fig. 1], that defines which firms are
allowed to participate in which of the m markets. Therefore,
x = col((xi))i∈I) ∈ Rn and n = 32. The firms cannot
access the production of all the competitors, but they are
allowed to communicate with their neighbors on a randomly
generated connected graph. We select randomly with uniform
distribution rk in [1, 2], Qi diagonal with diagonal elements
in [1, 8], qi in [1, 2], P¯k in [10, 20], χk in [1, 3], Xi in [5, 10],
for all i ∈ I, k = 1, . . . ,m.
The resulting setup satisfies all our theoretical assumptions
[15, VI]. We compute αmax according to (15) as αmax = 0.0043
and we choose the step sizes as in Lemma 2 to satisfy all the
conditions of Theorem 1.
We compare the performance of Algorithm 1 versus that of
the gradient-based method in [15, Alg. 1], which is to the best
of our knowledge the only other available single-layer scheme
to solve generalized games in the partial-decision information
setup. Specifically, in [15, Alg. 1] a gain c > 1αmax has to
be chosen, together with some step sizes τ , ν, σ: we set all
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Fig. 1. Comparison of Algorithm 1 and [15, Alg. 1] for different parameters
(the solid line for the theoretical step sizes). The second graph shows that
the convergent sequence generated by Algorithm 1 is fejr monotone in the
Φ-induced norm, despite the Euclidean distance from the GNE, ‖x−x∗‖, is
not monotonically decreasing.
the parameters such that the step sizes are as big as possible,
provided that the conditions in [15, Th. 2] are satisfied. This
results in very small step sizes, e.g., τ∗ ≈ 3 ∗ 10−9 (and
c∗ ≈ 400).
The results are illustrated in Figure 1, where the two
Algorithms are initialized with the same random initial condi-
tions. When setting the parameters that guarantee theoretical
convergence, [15, Alg. 1] is very slow, due to the small step
sizes; and our PPPA method shows a much faster convergence.
However, in our numerical experience, the bounds on the
parameters are pretty conservative, and in effect we observe
faster convergence for bigger step sizes. For [15, Alg. 1],
the fastest convergence is attained by setting c 100 times
smaller and the step sizes 107 times bigger than the theoretical
values; for larger values of the step sizes, convergence is
lost. We also remark that Algorithm 1 requires only one
round of communication per iteration (the agents exchange
the variables xi, λi) while [15, Alg. 1] requires two rounds
of communication (the agents exchange xi, λi, then they first
update and then exchange the variables zi).
To improve the convergence speed of Algorithm 1, we
apply the acceleration schemes discussed in Section VI. We
choose the parameters that ensure convergence. The impact is
remarkable, up to halving the number of iterations needed for
convergence, as shown in Figure 2.
B. Charging of plug-in electric vehicles
We consider the charging scheduling problem for a group
of plug-in electric vehicles, modeled by an aggregative game
as in [3]. Each user i, i ∈ I = {1, . . . , N}, can plan the
charging of its vehicle during a temporal horizon of 24 hours,
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Fig. 2. Number of iterations k needed to reach a precision of 10−2, i.e.,
‖xk − x∗‖ ≤ 0.01, with different acceleration schemes and parameters.
discretized into n¯ intervals. Specifically, each users aims at
choosing the energy injections xi ∈ Rn¯ of each time interval
to minimize its cost, given by the quadratic function
Ji(xi, avg(x)) = qix
>
i xi+ c
>
i x
i+(a(avg(x)+d)+ b1n¯)
>xi,
where qix>i + c
>
i x
i represents the battery degradation cost,
while (a(avg(x) + d) + b1n¯) is the cost of energy, with b > 0
a baseline price, a > 0 the inverse of the price elasticity of
demand and d ∈ Rn¯ the inelastic base demand (not related
to vehicle charging) along the temporal horizon. We assume a
maximum injection per interval for each vehicle and a desired
final charge level for each user, resulting in the local con-
straints Ωi = [0n¯, x¯i] ∩ {y ∈ Rn¯ | 1>n¯ y = γi}. Moreover, we
consider the transmission line constraints 0n¯ ≤
∑
i∈I xi ≤ c¯.
We choose N = 10, n¯ = 12. As in [3], for all i ∈ I, we
select qi in [0.002, 0.006], ci in [0.055, 0.095], γi in [0.6, 1]
with uniform distribution ; [x¯i]j = 0.25 with probability 20%,
[x¯i]j = 0 otherwise. We set [c¯]j as 0.4 if j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 11, 12},
as 1 otherwise (corresponding to more restrictive limitations
during the daytime); a = 0.038, b = 0.06 and d as in [3].
Because of the quadratic structure of the cost functions,
Standing Assumptions 1-2 hold for any choice of a > 0,
qi > 0. We let the agents communicate over a randomly
generated connected graph. Figure 3 shows the performance
of Algorithm2 compared to [17, Alg. 1] (which requires two
rounds of communication per iteration). Our PPPA signifi-
cantly outperforms the gradient-based method, when the step
sizes are set at their theoretical upper-bounds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Preconditioned proximal-point methods are suitable to de-
sign fully-distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithms. Our algorithms proved much faster than the exist-
ing pseudo-gradient-based methods, at least in our numerical
100 102 104 106
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100
Fig. 3. Distance of the primal variable from the v-GNE. Algorithm 2
outperforms [17, Alg. 1] when the theoretical step sizes are chosen (solid
lines).
experience, resulting in a considerable reduction of communi-
cation requirements. Besides, the operator theoretic approach
facilitates the design of provably correct acceleration schemes.
The extension of our results to games played on time-varying
communication networks is left as future research.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 9
By the explicit expression of JΦ−1A in (14), by Lipschitz
continuity of the projection and by recalling that the compo-
sition of continuous function is continuous, we just have to
show that the mappings ωk = col(xk,vk,λk) 7→ xk+1i are
continuous, for all i ∈ I. Specifically, we have that
xk+1i = hi(ω
k) := argmin
y∈Ωi
gi(y,ω
k),
where
gi(y,ω) =
(
Ji(y, pi(x)) +
τi
2α
∥∥y − xi∥∥2
+ 12α
∥∥diy −∑Nj=1 wijxi,j∥∥2 + (A>i λi)>y),
and pi(x) = 1τi+di (τixi,−i +
∑N
j=1 wijxj,−i). By continuity
of pi on RNn and Assumption 1, gi is a continuous function
relative to the set Rni ×RNn+Em+Nm. Moreover, gi is level
bounded in y uniformly in ω ([34, Def. 1.16]), i.e., for all
ω¯ ∈ RNn+Em+Nm and γ ∈ R there exist a neighbor V of ω¯
such that the set {(y,ω) | ω ∈ V, gi(y,ω) ≤ γ} is bounded
in Rni × RNn+Em+Nm (this follows since gi is continuous
and strongly convex in y for every ω). Therefore, the map hi
is outer semicontinuous and locally bounded [34, Cor. 7.42].
This is equivalent to hi being continuous, since hi is also
single-valued [34, Cor. 5.20].
B. Proof of Lemma 10
We recall that, under Standing Assumption 3, we have, for
any q > 0,
null (Lq) = null (Vq) = range(1N ⊗ Iq) = Eq. (31)
range(V >q ) ⊇ range (Lq) = null(1>N ⊗ Iq) = E⊥q , (32)
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where Lq = L⊗Iq , Vq = V ⊗Iq , and the second line follows
by Lq = V >q Vq .
i) Let us consider any ω∗ = col(x∗, s∗,v∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A˜)∩Σ.
Define σ∗ = x∗ + s∗; then we have
0n¯ ∈ αF˜ (x∗, σ∗) +Ln¯σ∗ + NΩ(x∗) +A>λ∗ (33a)
0n¯ = Ln¯σ
∗ (33b)
0Em = −Vmλ∗ (33c)
0Nm ∈ b+ NRNm≥0 (λ
∗)−Ax∗ + V >m v∗ (33d)
By (33c) and by (31), we have λ∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, for some
λ∗ ∈ Rm; by (33b) and since ω∗ ∈ Σ, it must hold
σ∗ = x∗+s∗ = 1N ⊗avg(x∗). It is then enough to prove that
the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in (4). By (33a),
by recalling thatA>(1N⊗λ∗) = A>λ∗ and F˜ (x∗,1N⊗x∗) =
F (x∗), we retrieve the first KKT condition in (4). We obtain
the second KKT condition by premultiplying both sides of
(33d) by (1>N ⊗ Im) and using that (1>N ⊗ Im)b = b, (1>N ⊗
Im)Lm = 0 by (31) and symmetry of L, (1>N ⊗ Im)A = A
and (1>N ⊗ Im)NRNm≥0 (1N ⊗ λ∗) = NNRm≥0(λ∗) = NRm≥0(λ∗).
ii) Let us consider any pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfying the KKT
conditions in (4) (one such pair exists by Standing Assumption
2). We next show that there exists v∗ ∈ REm such that ω∗ =
col(x∗,1N⊗avg(x∗)−x∗, z∗,1N⊗λ∗) ∈ zer(A˜)∩Σ. Clearly,
ω∗ ∈ Σ. Besides, ω∗ satisfies the conditions (33a)-(33c), as in
point i) above. By (4), there exists u∗ ∈ NRm≥0(λ∗) such that
Ax∗− b−u∗ = 0n. Also, NRNm≥0 (1N ⊗λ∗) = Πi∈INRm≥0(λ∗),
and it follows by properties of cones that col (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N ) ∈
NRNm≥0 (1N ⊗ λ∗), with u∗1 = · · · = u∗N =
1
N u
∗. Therefore
(1>N⊗Im) (−Ax∗ + b+ col (u∗1, . . . , u∗N )) = b−Ax∗+u∗ =
0m, or −Ax∗ + b + col (u∗1, . . . , u∗N ) ∈ null(1>N ⊗ Im) ⊆
range(V >m ), by (32). Therefore there exists v
∗ such that also
the condition (33d) is satisfied, for which ω∗ ∈ zer(A˜).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Analogously to Lemma 3, it can be shown that Algorithm 2
is equivalent to the iteration
ωk+1 ∈ JΦ˜−1A˜(ωk), (34)
modulo the transformation zk = V >m v
k. In particular, we next
show that the inclusion in (19) has a unique solution. First, we
notice that the problem is equivalent to solving the variational
inequality VI(gi(·, ϑk),Ωi), where ϑk = (xk, sk+1, sk,λk),
and gi(y, ϑk) := τiy + αF˜i(y, y + sk+1i ) − τixki + A>i λki +∑N
j=1 wij(σ
k
i − σkj ) is continuous. Moreover gi is strongly
monotone in y for any value of ϑk. In fact, F˜i, is θ˜-Lipschitz,
because F˜ is θ˜-Lipschitz by Lemma 11. Therefore we can
write (y−y′)>(gi(y, ϑk)−gi(y′, ϑk)) ≥ (τi−α
√
2θ˜)‖y−y′‖2,
for any y, y′ ∈ Rn, and the conclusions follows from the
assumption on α. Therefore, we can conclude that, for all
k ∈ N, the VI(gki (·, ϑk),Ωi) (and hence, the inclusion in
(19)) admits a unique solution [25, Th. 2.3.3]; moreover the
solution map ϑk 7→ xk+1 is continuous in ϑk [35, Th. 4.1].
Therefore, as in Lemma 9, the operator JΦ˜−1A˜ is single-
valued, continuous, and dom(JΦ˜−1A˜) = R2n+Em+Nm.
As such, the convergence of Algorithm 2 can be shown sim-
ilarly to Theorem 1. The only difference is that, while JΦ−1A
in (12) is FQNE on the whole space R2n+Em+Nm, JΦ˜−1A˜
is FQNE only on the subspace Σ in (23), that is invariant,
namely JΦ˜−1A˜(Σ) ⊆ Σ (this follows, as in Remark 6, by the
explicit updates of (34)). More formally, by Lemma 12 and
as in Lemma 6, we have that for all (ω,u) ∈ gra(Φ˜−1A˜)
such that ω ∈ Σ, for all (ω∗,u∗) ∈ gra(Φ˜−1A˜) such that
ω∗ ∈ zer(A˜) ∩ Σ, it holds that 〈u − u∗ | ω − ω∗〉Φ˜ ≥ 0.
Therefore, as in Lemma 8, we have that 〈ω − JΦ˜−1A˜(ω) |
JΦ˜−1A˜(ω) − ω∗〉Φ˜ ≥ 0, namely JΦ˜−1A˜ is FQNE on Σ,
under the Φ˜-induced scalar product. We consider the restriction
JΦ˜−1A˜|Σ : Σ→ Σ and the Hilbert space defined by the vector
space Σ equipped with the scalar product 〈·|·〉Φ˜|Σ. We are
therefore in a position to apply Lemma 7, and the proof follows
as in Theorem 1, since JΦ˜−1A˜|Σ is FQNE, continuous, and
dom(JΦ˜−1A˜|Σ) = Σ.
D. Monotonicity of the extended pseudo-gradient
Monotonicity of the operator R>F , with F being the
extended pseudo-gradient in (7), has been sometimes postu-
lated to show convergence of (G)NE seeking algorithms under
partial-decision information [27, Ass. 4(i)], [36, Ass. 5], [37,
Ass. 4]. Next, we show that this is a very restrictive condition.
For simplicity, we assume that the costs Ji are twice
continuously differentiable, for all i ∈ I. The derivative
with respect to the full argument (Jacobian) of the operator
R>F is D(x) := ∂R>F (x)∂x = diag
((∂R>i ∇xiJi
∂x (xi)
)
i∈I
)
:=
diag((Di(xi))i∈I), with D : RNn → RNn×Nn. Then, R>F
is monotone if and only if D(x) + D(x)> < 0 for all
x ∈ RNn [25, Prop. 2.3.2]. Since D is block diagonal, we
can equivalently check this condition for the single blocks.
Without loss of generality, let us consider only the first block
(for the other blocks, the following applies modulo row and
column permutations), for which
D1(x1) + D1(x1)
>=

2∂2J1(x1)
∂x21
∂2J1(x1)
∂x1∂x2
· · · ∂2J1(x1)∂x1∂xN
∂2J1(x1)
>
∂x1∂x2
...
∂2J1(x1)
>
∂x1∂xN
0(n−n1)×(n−n1)
 .
Let us call H(x1) = D1(x1) + D1(x1)> and A(x1), B(x1)
the upper left and upper right blocks of H , respectively. It
holds that A(x1) < 2µIn1  0, for all x1, by Standing
Assumption 2. Let J be any proper subset of {1, 2, . . . , Nn},
and denote H−J(x1) the matrix obtained by removing the J-th
rows and columns from H(x1). Sylvester’s criterion states that
a necessary (and sufficient) condition for H < 0 to hold is that
det(H−J) ≥ 0,∀J ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , Nn}. Let us now assume that,
for some x¯1 ∈ Rn and some k ∈ {1, n−n1} the k-th column
of B(x¯1), Bk, has at least one nonzero element. Therefore,
we take J = {n1 + 1, . . . , n1 + k − 1, n1 + k + 1, . . . , Nn},
and we can compute the determinant of the 2×2 block matrix
H−J as
det(H−J(x¯1)) = det(A(x¯1)) det(0−B>k A(x¯1)−1Bk) < 0,
and the inequality follows because A,A−1  0 and Bk 6= 0.
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We conclude that the operator R>F is monotone if and
only if ∂
2Ji
∂xi∂xj
(xi) = 0ni×nj for all xi ∈ Rn, all i ∈ I,
j ∈ I\{i}. This only holds if the cost function of each agent
does not depend on the actions of the other agents (or if the
part of the cost function that depends on the actions of the
other agents is a separable addend).
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